Crosstalk in concurrent repeated games impedes direct reciprocity and requires stronger levels of forgiveness

Reiter, Johannes G and Hilbe, Christian and Rand, David G and Chatterjee, Krishnendu and Nowak, Martin A (2018) Crosstalk in concurrent repeated games impedes direct reciprocity and requires stronger levels of forgiveness. Nature Communications, 9 (1). Article number: 555 . ISSN 2041-1723

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41467-017-02721-8

Abstract

Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for cooperation among humans. Many of our daily interactions are repeated. We interact repeatedly with our family, friends, colleagues, members of the local and even global community. In the theory of repeated games, it is a tacit assumption that the various games that a person plays simultaneously have no effect on each other. Here we introduce a general framework that allows us to analyze "crosstalk" between a player's concurrent games. In the presence of crosstalk, the action a person experiences in one game can alter the person's decision in another. We find that crosstalk impedes the maintenance of cooperation and requires stronger levels of forgiveness. The magnitude of the effect depends on the population structure. In more densely connected social groups, crosstalk has a stronger effect. A harsh retaliator, such as Tit-for-Tat, is unable to counteract crosstalk. The crosstalk framework provides a unified interpretation of direct and upstream reciprocity in the context of repeated games.

Item Type: Article
DOI: 10.1038/s41467-017-02721-8
Uncontrolled Keywords: Social evolution, applied mathematics, cooperation, human behaviour
Subjects: 000 Computer science, knowledge & general works > 000 Computer science, knowledge & systems > 004 Data processing & computer science
Research Group: Chatterjee Group
SWORD Depositor: Sword Import User
Depositing User: Sword Import User
Date Deposited: 08 Feb 2018 07:48
Last Modified: 08 Feb 2018 07:50
URI: https://repository.ist.ac.at/id/eprint/964

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